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JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, by Robert P. Merges. 
Harvard University Press, 2011. 422 pp. Hardback $59.95. 
Reviewed by Amy L. Landers, Pacific McGeorge School of Law. 
alanders@pacific.edu 
Robert Merges’ scholarship has a continuing and significant influence on 
intellectual property law.  As the saying goes, the author’s reputation 
precedes him.  THE COMPLEX ECONOMICS OF PATENT SCOPE, co-
authored by Merges, is responsible for insight into patent law and the 
encouragement of invention.1  His ongoing work in the field of intellectual 
property law has been widely influential. 
In JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Merges considers 
concepts that are extraordinarily complex and controversial.  As Merges’ 
earlier writing recognizes, the current intellectual property system relies 
primarily on utilitarian justifications.2  As another leading work 
authoritatively states, “[t]oday it is acknowledged that analysis and 
evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within 
an economic framework that seeks to align that law with the dictates of 
economic efficiency.”3  In its broadest form, the intellectual property 
system has been supported by the incentive story—that is, legal protection 
provides incentives to invest in the creation of new works that ultimately 
inure to the benefit of the public. 
In a departure from this framework, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY omits nearly all discussion of utilitarianism.4  Rather, Merges 
introduces the book with an unequivocal rejection of this basis as a 
sufficient foundational justification for IP law, explaining that “[t]he 
empty promises and ethical holes in the utilitarian theory of IP are just too 
glaring” (p.83).  In its stead, Merges draws on legal philosophers John 
Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls to support the book’s central 
proposition that “IP law deserves a place in a just and rational modern 
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state” (p.196).  According to Merges, the principle justification for IP law 
is the individual creator (p.72). 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY is a rich and thoughtful 
work that raises important questions.  Merges considers the selected legal 
theorists with depth and clarity.  Difficult concepts are handled with 
thoroughness and subtlety.  A number of the propositions are undoubtedly 
provocative.  By placing the primary emphasis on the creator, the book 
seeks to move the focus of the IP system to one that, at an operational 
level, inures to the benefit of a professional creative class.  This work 
emphasizes that intellectual property is a property right that allows 
creators to control who may use the work, and—if used—to specify the 
terms (p.242). 
In doing so, Merges neatly solves certain problems associated with the 
current IP system.  Nevertheless, it is a rare case that one can attempt to 
move a system’s foundations without creating disruption.  By advocating 
strong property rights in IP, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY asserts a number of challenging propositions about a system 
that some currently regard as too powerful. 
In JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Merges expands on his 
prior work in Lockean theory5 by advancing that the expenditure of labor 
justifies appropriation through the mechanism of intellectual property 
rights.  Merges explains that Locke’s TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT demonstrates that the effort expended through the work 
of one’s body allows one to legitimately claim ownership to creations 
assembled from the public domain (p.35).  To place this claim in context, 
Merges explains that IP fits within Locke’s overarching goal toward 
human flourishing (p.41).  That is, Merges uses Locke’s labor theory to 
support the book’s central thesis that IP is justified as a property right.  As 
Merges explains, “[c]rowning this labor with property serves two ends:  it 
honors the effort involved and calls forth more of it” (p.38). 
One controversial aspect of the book considers that Locke’s property 
theory translates to intangibles.  As Merges explains, “Locke’s ideas work 
perfectly well in the context of creative work, so long as we picture 
removal not as something literal and physical, but as something arising 
from a necessary convention or shared understanding” (p.39).  Among 
other support, Merges cites Locke’s AN ESSAY CONCERNING 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (“ESSAY”) that describes Locke’s own 
work as that of “an Under-Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and 
removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way of Knowledge.”6 
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Certainly Locke’s justification for property, and ultimately government, is 
stated in terms of tangibles and the labor of the body.  As Justin Hughes 
has recognized, “it is not always clear that the creation of an idea involves 
labor” as Locke used that term.7  One plausible reading of Locke’s 
description of himself as an Under-Labourer is that this image operates as 
a metaphor rather than a belief.  That is, Locke’s reference may have been 
a modest attempt to contrast his writing as the effort of an “Under-
Labourer” with the work of “master-builders, whose mighty designs, in 
advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of 
posterity,” citing the work of physicist Isaac Newton and mathematician 
Christiaan Huygens.8 
One can identify from Locke’s ESSAY that he perceived a clear 
distinction between mental and physical acts. As one example, Locke 
describes “invention” as the mental creation of a complex idea that is the 
“voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds; so 
he that first invented printing, or etching, had an idea of it in his mind, 
before it ever existed.”9  This quote suggests, and it is implicit throughout 
Locke’s ESSAY, that man creates the intangible in the mind and 
appropriates or manipulates tangible objects with the body.10  According 
to Locke’s ESSAY, one’s mind is one’s soul and responsible for the 
exercise of liberty.11  Given Locke’s reverence for the mind, one might 
query whether Locke would have considered ideas as property without 
fuller discussion. 
Regarding Kant, Merges explains that the legal concept of property is 
necessary for creators to have access and control over objects in order to 
exercise the full extent of their autonomy (p.72).  According to the book, 
“[f]reedom to appropriate is so basic, so tied to matters of individual will 
and personal choice, that Kant finds it unthinkable to rule out large 
categories of things from the domain of the potential ownable” (p.72).  
Acknowledging that the application of this author-centric view will be 
“jarring” to some readers, Merges argues that a property label for IP is 
consistent with Kant’s idea of a free rational will if one views creativity as 
a choice to carry out a work (pp.75, 79).  Pushing against the trend in 
recent scholarship that recognizes the significant influence of social and 
cultural forces on creativity, Merges relies on Kant to shift the emphasis 
back onto the creator.  In this vein, he explains that a creator’s work 
inspires others:  “Like a many-sided flint, sparks fly off a work of genius, 
igniting other minds, other individual creators, who are inspired to stretch 
themselves and thereby reach their potential” (p.92). 
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Next, Merges considers Rawls’ A THEORY OF JUSTICE to conclude 
that those in the original position12 would have categorized IP as a basic 
right despite the fact that its benefits fall disproportionally on creative 
professionals (p.110-11).  JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
finds that those wishing to live in a society that fosters an autonomous and 
creative citizenry would have chosen IP as a basic right (p.112).  Just as 
Rawls rejected a utilitarian conception, Merges similarly finds that those 
considering IP in the Rawlsian state are “not required to maximize social 
welfare with respect to their ‘productive decisions’” (p.111).  In essence, 
Merges considers creativity as an act of liberty due to its relation to the 
individual and one’s autonomy (p.117). 
Even if one does not accept that IP would be considered a basic right, 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY concludes that IP would 
not violate Locke’s second principle of justice.13  To demonstrate this 
point, Merges describes that the majority—a core—of every work derives 
from an individual’s talent, vision, and will.  This viewpoint holds that 
society’s interest derives solely from inputs beyond the creator and sits at 
the periphery of the right.  According to Merges, societal claims― such as 
those that seek costless redistribution―derive from this periphery (p.122-
23).  According to this account, this value is redistributed fairly in return 
for society’s contribution in the form of, as some examples, access to the 
work after the right expires, benefits that derive from the existence of the 
work, and through taxation of IP-protected works.  In contrast, the creative 
core of a work—the individual’s contribution—supports what Merges 
describes as an “ineluctable property” claim, an “inviolate property right,” 
and an “immovable substrate” (pp.122-23).  Merges explains that this core 
derives from the Rawlsian concept of desert, which represents a legitimate 
claim to an entitlement.14 
For Merges, reliance on Locke, Kant, and Rawls demonstrates that 
intellectual property derives from an act of human creativity that arises 
from an individual’s “attention, effort, and personal vision” (p.114).  Each 
philosopher brings individual support for Merges’ claim that IP has a 
central role in a society (p.305).  Through this lens, classic utilitarian 
concerns, such as the burdens that such rights place on society, can be 
expected to recede in importance. 
Given that Merges accepts that agreement with IP’s foundational 
principles is unlikely to coalesce, he writes that policy discourse should 
remain on the midlevel principles of the law (pp.144-45).  These midlevel 
principles include nonremoval, proportionality, efficiency, and dignity, 
with the fullest treatment in the book given to proportionality and dignity.  
The IP Law Book Review  56 
Because midlevel principles derive from the study of the detailed rules 
applied in practice, Merges finds that such principles do not depend on 
any particular foundational theories for their validity (p.140).  As Merges 
explains, at the midlevel “[t]he conversation is more productive—and a lot 
more civil!—than it would be if participants tried to conduct it at the 
ultimate normative level” (p.144).  Merges likens these points of 
discussion to the “Midelevel Bar and Grille,”—a place where there may be 
ample disagreement but a common vocabulary (p.141).  
Perhaps, as Merges suggests, the Midelevel Bar and Grille is an excellent 
starting point for policy discussion.  Nonetheless, foundations have a way 
of impacting policy and, ultimately, the real world.  As one example, 
Merges’ foundational focus on creators reverberates through his later 
discussions preferencing the contributions of creative professionals at the 
midlevel.  This suggests that the lines between these layers are quite 
permeable and that therefore discourse cannot be so easily confined.  
Engaged consideration of foundational principles might be civil, could be 
useful, and is likely to be inevitable. 
Intellectual property is rife with pressure points. Are there limitations that 
can relieve them?  JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY notes 
several—antitrust, misuse, the First Amendment, and other limitations 
built into current law.  Perhaps one of most fascinating parts of the book is 
an eloquent application of the principles of proportionality to 
contextualize the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. 
MercExchange.15  Applying the principle that the right should be 
proportional to the value or significance of the work, JUSTIFYING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY explains that eBay stands for the rule that 
injunctions should not confer excessive leverage to intellectual property 
rights holders (p.166-67).16  In Merges’ view, proportionality permits the 
limited government modification of a holder’s property right and operates 
as a useful analytic tool for examining important questions that arise in IP.  
As he observes, “[i]t is hard to defend a legal system that permits grossly 
distorted transactions” (p.190). 
How far can such exceptions go?  According to Merges, not as far as 
others might have it.  As he explains, “[t]his freedom to either waive one’s 
rights entirely, or else hold onto them for purposes of economic 
exploitation or simple aesthetic preference, is what property is all about” 
(p. 228).  As one example, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
rejects the position that copyright in the digital realm should be subject to 
liability rules and a system of compulsory licensing.17  Rather, Merges 
reiterates that digital copyright should be treated as a property right 
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subject to the waiver and consent of rights holders (pp.249-55).  Further, 
Merges argues that re-mixers should not obtain significant leeway under 
fair use because doing so might prevent a market for the use of portions of 
musical works from ever developing (pp.251-54).  Given the technological 
shift that has occurred for digital works, Merges predicts that, “IP rights 
may have to be strengthened for those rights to continue their traditional 
function of adequately rewarding hard-working creators” (p.250). 
This review’s description of the limits of IP explored in the book is not 
complete.  Further, as Merges suggests, the problems that are presented to 
the IP system are difficult, complex and in a state of flux.  The strength of 
IP rights, eBay, waiver, and limitations at the boundaries are critical 
issues.  Moreover, how these doctrines interact appears to be as important 
as each one individually. 
Certainly, the line between IP rights and allowable use cannot be drawn 
with precision.  It is also an extremely significant point of contention.  The 
need for access to informational inputs for new works is an issue that 
touches far more than remix culture.  An alternative viewpoint might hold 
that the ecosystem that contributes to outcomes includes more than 
creators, and some of those inputs can be central to a work’s existence.  In 
other words, even if one accepts that creators are entirely necessary to a 
work, individuals are rarely sufficient.  Moreover, even talented creative 
professionals can be stymied by other’s strong property rights.18  
Although JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY makes a 
fascinating case, the principle that IP must be treated as a property right to 
accomplish a creator’s goals is a challenging proposition.19  As 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY recognizes, the 
contributions of earlier creators are inspirational to those who create 
later—that is, “genius awakens another genius” (p.92).  That vibrant 
image can conform to IP law only if relatively firm lines can be identified 
and maintained as the creative process engages.  It seems instructive that a 
number of high technology industries arose in the absence of IP 
enforcement, or in areas in which IP law created safe harbors.20  This 
suggests that compartmentalization between inspiration and use of 
another’s work is difficult to maintain, and not uniformly productive.  
As for individual creators, the central message of JUSTIFYING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY goes far toward dissolving the 
misconception that creative work is generated through the intervention of 
inspiration, genius, or otherwise inexplicable phenomena.  Instead, 
Merges’ archetypical creator is J.K. Rowling, who created the Harry 
Potter series based on “individual will and commitment” (p.134).  Under 
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this view, one who undertakes the hard work to develop a piece earns the 
right to control it. 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY does not claim that IP law 
must advance all creativity.  Rather, the book favors particular sources of 
expression—that is, those that derive from a creative professional class.  
According to Merges, professional creators bring the world value in the 
form of “cultural icons and shared touchstones” (p.233).  To Merges, the 
principle of autonomy and the pursuit of profit create no inconsistency.  
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY examines large 
organizations, small entities, and individuals as potential sources of 
creative output.  Of these, the work emphasizes individual professionals 
and small scale organizations as the primary sources of groundbreaking 
work.  Against this background, the work claims that strong IP protection 
should operate to enable professionals to earn a living.  As it states, “the 
care and feeding of this class is an essential—maybe the essential—
function of the IP system” (p.247).  In part, this argument pushes against 
the arguments made for less intrusive IP rights to facilitate the 
democratization of culture geared to enable amateurs to create second-
order works (p.245).  The reasons are two-fold:  first, because 
“[p]rofessionals and the high-quality work they do are still crucial to the 
industries that rely on IP rights;” and second, “solid respect for IP rights is 
also the most flexible and accommodating policy, one capable of 
supporting a thriving bottom-up cultural movement as well” (p.196). 
Certainly shared culture existed long before IP law and continues to exist 
outside of it.  Further, as a universally present characteristic in everyone, 
creativity exists in many forms.21  JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY’S prioritization of economically significant works leaves the 
student, amateur, and the average citizen out of the core creativity 
calculus. 
Merges acknowledges that an approach favoring the creative professional 
“may be uncomfortable for some” (p.247).  As the book finds that 
foundational principles derive from autonomy and effort, exceptional 
treatment of commercially significant works does give one pause.  Perhaps 
privileging economically relevant works represents an effort toward 
carving out areas in which IP can be implemented more moderately.  If so, 
preferences for the determination of ownership, validity, and enforcement 
would most strongly inure to those that Merges argues represent the 
central purposes of IP.  Presumably, this would allow a vibrant community 
of information sharing among non-professionals.  On the other hand, 
counter-cultural and amateur works may share many of the humanly 
The IP Law Book Review  59 
The IP Law Book Review  60 
                                                
expressive elements of the type described by Locke, Kant, and Rawls. In 
some cases, perhaps more so.  
In AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, Locke 
asserts that “[i]deas thus made up of several simple ones put together, I 
call Complex; such as are Beauty, Gratitude, a Man, an Army, the 
Universe.”22  Intellectual property theory, although made of smaller 
components, is similarly rife with complex (and frequently moving) parts.  
Certainly, this brief overview cannot hope to capture all of the complexity 
of Merges’ JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.  Merges adds 
to his influential body of scholarship by adopting foundational principles 
that focus on the author, the creator, and the designer to support the legal 
institution of intellectual property.  Virtually every page includes rich and 
cross-referenced dialogue.  The work examines layers of theory, which are 
then applied to specific problems. 
The work can be expected to trigger debate and discussion.  As it 
describes (and a review of the scholarly literature confirms), there are 
propositions in the book that are not part of any universal consensus.  
Perhaps, as Rawls suggests, judgments are best made after consideration 
of all possibilities and examination of their support from relevant 
philosophical argument.23  For its part, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY makes a clear, thorough and interesting case for its theories. 
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DEVELOPMENT:  THE ROLE OF NGOS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, by Duncan Matthews. Edward Elgar, 2011. 286 pp. 
Hardback $125.00. 
Reviewed by Margaret Chon, Seattle University School of Law. 
mchon@seattleu.edu 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) fall within the diffuse family of 
the “non-”, including non-state actors more broadly.1  As observed astutely, 
“[a]ny attempt to define NGOs in positive rather than negative terms is 
problematic, beyond the observation that they tend to be private citizens’ 
groups established to further certain common objectives of their members.  
The objectives pursued by NGOs differ considerably.”2  Neither market nor 
state, the third space inhabited by these types of organizations defies 
attempts at positive articulation, at least within the state-centric rubrics of 
international law or international relations. 
This famously amorphous negative domain thus requires further 
specification, if only to make better sense of its many moving parts.  In his 
book, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF NGOS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, Duncan Matthews, a Professor of Intellectual Property 
Law at Queen Mary, University of London, achieves this necessary 
particularity by exploring the impact of NGOs within global intellectual 
property (IP) regimes.  Further narrowing the inquiry, he focuses on “public 
action NGOs” engaging in “non-governmental public action by, and on 
behalf, of disadvantaged people and [their] impact . . . in reducing poverty 
and exclusion” (p.11).  In examining this subset of NGO activity, he 
employs three additional analytical frames:  (1) the specific IP domain of 
public health, contrasted with agriculture, genetic resources, and traditional 
knowledge (AGRTK); (2) the relationship of these two distinct IP regimes 
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to the typically separate legal domains of human rights and/or development; 
and (3) the impact of the relevant NGOs within developing as well as 
industrialized states.  This last dimension means that this book is the 
culmination of an ambitious comparative methodological inquiry―covering 
different perspectives not just between NGOs located in the global North 
and South, but also among emerging economies that have been major norm 
generators through their international as well as domestic IP initiatives. 
About a decade ago, the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
(CIPR) issued a ground-breaking report on the interplay between IP, human 
rights and development.3  Chaired by the late John H. Barton, an American 
IP scholar, the CIPR analyzed the existing global intellectual property legal 
regimes from the perspective of their impact on lesser advantaged states and 
populations.  It attempted to bridge the gap between the current 
instrumental and utilitarian emphasis within IP discourse and the universal, 
natural rights-inflected language of human rights4 and, in this regard, noted 
the contributions of NGOs.  In this study, Matthews goes far beyond a mere 
nod to these efforts.  Front and center of this book are NGOs operating not 
only within Geneva-based international IP norm-setting as it relates to 
human rights and development, but also within various national contexts 
within selected developing countries. 
Matthews makes several distinct contributions to the existing literature on 
the role of NGOs in global governance.  His sustained focus on public 
interest NGOs adds much-needed depth to the growing literature on NGOs 
generally.  He explores the reasons underlying differences among NGO 
strategies within three developing countries:  South Africa, Brazil and India.  
These case studies also provide a common platform for further elaboration 
of and support for two widely acknowledged network organization 
approaches to this area:  coalition-building and framing theories (pp.5-9).5  
And in the course of providing all of the above, Matthews also 
accomplishes one important (although possibly thankless) task:  he provides 
a clear and concise descriptive summary of relevant treaty frameworks and 
other legal provisions for both IP and human rights. 
Each of the book’s strengths is significant.  It is truly an achievement to 
have simultaneously navigated so many analytical vectors and technical 
intricacies demanded by IP.  Yet although descriptively and analytically 
successful, the book is perhaps insufficiently critical of its normative 
implications.  This suggests that a network organization approach to NGOs 
may be in need of complementary theories or further development on its 
own.  Reviewing this book provides signposts for additional possible lines 
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of theoretical elaboration useful for the study of all transnational non-state 
actors, including the public action NGOs scrutinized here. 
Liberally sprinkled throughout this book are sidebars containing excerpts of 
significant primary source material.  Chapters on public health (Chapter 2), 
AGRTK (Chapter 3) and human rights (Chapter 7) can stand alone as 
reference tools for these legally and technically challenging areas.  The area 
of AGRTK can be especially arcane and baroque, consisting of overlapping 
multiple IP global regimes such as breeder’s rights and protection of plant 
genetic resources by patent or sui generis laws.  In addition to these IP 
regimes, AGRTK is governed by environmental and biosafety regimes, not 
to mention the food security, poverty reduction and sustainability aspects 
that are critical to any development focus (pp.52-91).6  The book easily 
clarifies and summarizes these different domains, and moreover provides a 
short historical overview of each. 
Matthews includes an abundance of material on developing country NGOs 
in addition to the more accessible international NGOs based in various 
sectors of the global North.  With the assistance of Viviana Muñoz Tellez,7 
who is currently a Geneva-based policymaker, he participated in “over 60 
interviews with representatives of NGOs, broader social movements, 
indigenous communities, and local communities in developing countries,” 
as well as their counterparts in industrialized countries (pp.7-8).  The 
resulting narratives resist essentializing8 the “South” or “developing 
countries” as one monolithic bloc with indistinguishable histories and 
motives. 
In the public health arena, for example, Matthews describes how South 
Africa’s government was pressured by NGOs with roots in the previous 
anti-apartheid and gay rights movements, which then turned their efforts 
towards a campaign for access to affordable medicines by “[s]eeking 
recourse to the human rights principles enshrined in the South African 
Constitution” (p.103).  By contrast, Brazil’s emergence from dictatorship in 
the mid-80s as a result of social movements for democracy led to its 
establishment of a universal health care system, including a commitment to 
access to affordable medicines.  One consequence is that by the mid-90s, 
Brazil was one of a handful of countries with a policy of universal access to 
anti-retroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS (pp.125-30).  However, this policy 
eventually collided with the patent protection mandated by TRIPs Article 
27, which sets forth that “patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.”9  To 
implement its obligations under TRIPS, Brazil introduced protection for 
pharmaceuticals, an area that was previously unprotected (p.129),10 along 
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with compulsory licensing provisions to balance the stronger patent 
protection (p.130).  The role of Brazilian NGOs co-evolved with the 
government’s strong commitment to public health.  While local NGOs had 
a less prominent role than their South African counterparts in addressing the 
initial policy conflicts between patents and public health, they (like the 
South Africans) began to mobilize in response to U.S. challenges to these 
compulsory licensing provisions and, in doing so, relied on the language of 
human rights contained within the Brazilian constitution (pp.133-34). 
India’s colonial legacy led to a commitment by its government in 1970 to 
exclude from patent protection essential goods such as pharmaceuticals 
(p.164).  Like Brazil, the Indian government was obligated to modify this 
approach in the mid-90s in response to TRIPS.  It then collaborated with an 
expert panel—not exactly a NGO, but still a non-state actor in the form of 
the aptly named National Working Group on Patent Laws (p.166), which in 
turn became an institutional locus for public debate on the conflict between 
patents and public health.  This non-state institution influenced Indian 
Supreme Court rulings by pointing out, inter alia, that the new obligations 
with respect to patent law could conflict with the Indian constitutional 
provision on the right to life (p.167). 
Through these and other case studies, Matthews points to both similar and 
different catalysts for social movements cohering into NGO activity.  In all 
three countries, for example, NGOs were mobilized by the TRIPS 
Agreement’s insistence on patent protection for pharmaceuticals as well as 
the right to health recognized by their respective constitutions.  They also 
all fulfilled a need for advocacy and assistance in technical subject matter 
that may not be easily understood by civil society.  But these NGOs also 
had differing roles vis-à-vis their governments, based on specific cultural, 
political and historical contexts.  In weaving together these comparative 
approaches to public health and IP, Matthews also gives brief but critical 
background to important IP and development disputes, at both international 
and national levels.  Most of the legal literature focuses on the former, 
especially the work of NGOs around the Development Agenda in the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  Of course, Matthews discusses 
the Development Agenda (pp.248-50), but does not limit himself to this 
obvious international initiative by developing countries. 
The primary theoretical framework of this book is fairly straightforward:  
Matthews claims that coalitions between NGOs and developing countries 
“may provide a counterweight to the traditionally close relationship 
between industry groups and developed countries….” (p.6).  He also relies 
on what he calls the “corollary” to coalition-building theory:  “framing” 
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(pp.7-8).  Using the language of human rights, for instance, NGOs were 
able to re-frame the property-oriented, technical and economically 
instrumental language of IP favored by industrialized blocs into a more 
public interest-oriented and less parochial discourse—one that substantively 
impacted IP law and policy-making by and within developing countries.  
The result is that IP is now connected more explicitly not just to human 
rights regimes but also to the production of other public goods such as 
global public health and environmental sustainability. 
The book provides much evidence to support the use of both coalition-
building and framing as two critical tools used to turn IP towards a larger 
horizon of public interest goals.  In the area of farmers’ rights, for example, 
Matthews traces the important influences of international NGOs on UN-led 
initiatives in the area of food security through the language of “farmers’ 
rights,” which includes, among other things, the “right to equitably 
participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture” and “the right to participate in making 
decisions, at the national level, on matters related to the conservation and 
sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture” (pp.60, 
74-84).  On a domestic level in India, the sustained activity of NGOs 
resulted in a decision by the Indian government to implement a sui generis 
system rather than a patent system for protection of plant genetic 
resources—no small victory (p.195).  The normative core of Matthews’ 
comparative approach is an implicit commitment towards greater 
involvement by civil society within the often faceless machinations of 
global law and policy-making.  NGOs may not have the ability to make 
treaties but, in partnership with states, they can affect public norm-setting, 
interpretation and implementation.  The book is replete with concrete 
instances of this process.  Thus the book’s successes are considerable.  It 
adds a tremendous amount to our sense of how NGOs operate on the 
ground.  It is exceedingly well-documented and detailed, and demonstrates 
the power of coalitions and framing. 
However, the subject matter may have outgrown the existing theoretical 
approaches.  Social science literature on NGOs dates to the mid-1990s, 
around the same time that many of these global IP issues became highly 
politicized areas of law.  NGO scholarship is dominated so far by coalition-
building, network organization or nodal governance theories (hereinafter 
network theories), including framing theories.  Early work by Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink from an international relations perspective 
focused on “networks . . . motivated primarily by shared principled ideas or 
values (transnational advocacy networks).”11  As they put it, “[w]hat 
distinguishes principled activists of the kind we discuss in this volume is the 
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intensely self-conscious and self-reflective nature of their normative 
awareness.  No mere automatic “enactors,” these are people who seek to 
amplify the generative power of norms, broaden the scope of practices those 
norms engender, and sometimes even renegotiate or transform the norms 
themselves.”12  In this account, the outcome of the policy efforts of NGOs 
is assumed without analysis to be laudable.  Similar thematic concerns and 
assumptions underlie Matthews’ project of exploring public action NGOs. 
While successful in predicting whether and how these networks operate 
(p.201),13 network theories of NGOs and other non-state actors typically 
omit discussion of accountability, legitimacy and representation.  These 
qualities are arguably essential to any public policy-making sphere, whether 
of states or non-state actors such as NGOs intervening on behalf of the 
public in the name of the public interest.14  The burgeoning number and 
influence of NGOs both domestically and internationally,15 particularly 
their influence in the domain of development,16 make assessment along 
these governance dimensions crucial.  While one might agree with the 
substantive positions taken by many of the so-called public action NGOs 
highlighted in Matthews’ book, he neither critically evaluates the scientific 
bona fides of their advocacy positions, nor suggests any criteria of 
legitimacy for evaluating their impact.  In the area of AGRTK, for example, 
NGO advocates have been deeply concerned with transgenic technology 
coupled with food industry concentration in the global North.17  However, 
some recent academic critiques claim that Northern (particularly European) 
NGOs have exported industrialized countries’ attitudes towards 
environmental risk assessment to developing countries, without fully 
considering possible benefits to the rural poor of transgenic technology 
within these countries.18  While state actors are fallible, so too are non-state 
actors such as NGOs.19  Thus NGOs may have too little accountability for 
the human rights claims they make on behalf of others, and moreover may 
not be fully representative of those others for whom they claim to speak.20  
And although their expertise may be of great assistance, particularly in 
technically complex areas, their legitimacy ought to be measured by the 
same evidence-based policy-making standard that is expected of state 
actors.21  This is especially the case where NGOs serve in a co-regulatory 
capacity with states, rather than simply an advocacy role as seems to be the 
case with most of the NGOs studied in Matthews’ book.  Indeed, Matthews 
does not differentiate explicitly between the different possible roles that 
NGOs play within global IP regimes, ranging from consultative activities 
and technical assistance (emphasized here) to engaging in more overt 
regulatory strategies (perhaps under-emphasized). 
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Even if governance attributes such as accountability or legitimacy are 
satisfied, can the value added to the law-making process by NGOs be 
justified within a state-centered framework of international law?  A global 
administrative law framework derived in part from international relations 
theory and political philosophy could provide some normative scaffolding 
for the assertion of human rights on behalf of third parties by NGOs.22  It 
would also supplement a network theory approach in important ways.  One 
significant question is whether public action NGO activity is qualitatively 
different from the actions of other non-state actors such as 
intergovernmental organizations or for-profit firms or any combination of 
these and state actors.23  For example, does the work of these public action 
NGOs fill a need not otherwise occupied by other subjects of transnational 
law?  
A possible, partial answer suggested by global governance theory is that 
NGOs inhabit a space opened by simultaneous market and government 
failure.24  Along similar lines, a liberal economic analysis of non-profit 
organizations might predict that “N[G]Os produce certain public goods 
desired by one or some segments of the society, but not by a majority. 
According to this theory, the more diverse a society is, the more extensive 
the N[G]O sector is likely to be.”25  Evidence uncovered by Matthews 
seems to provide some support for these views.  All extant theories of 
NGOs—whether influenced by network, global governance, market-
government failure or other approaches—could benefit from detailed case 
studies such as those explored by Matthews.  What legal scholars can bring 
to the table in this interdisciplinary scholarly endeavor is precisely what 
Matthews provides: a deep understanding of the law (rather than “norms” 
more generally) and a nuanced understanding of how NGOs can affect 
different aspects of formal legal regimes.  Legal scholars can also illustrate 
how raw state power may be tempered by legal institutions and legal rules 
around which social movement goals may coalesce through the efforts of 
non-state actors such as NGOs. 
NGOs pierce the monopoly of states on legitimate political representation.  
Despite their location in the terminological realm of the “non-,” these 
institutions have contributed constructively and materially to global 
regulation of knowledge goods via their linkage of IP, human rights and 
development.  Professor Matthews has deftly and meticulously contributed 
to our growing grasp of civil society actors and their expanding influence 
within global legal regimes.  This is no minor feat, either for him or the 
subjects of this book. 
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Demonstrating that some “who do” also can teach, author-practitioners 
Mark V.B. Partridge and Phillip Barengolts have created an informative 
resource consisting of “actual and recommended sample documents for 
federal court trademark and copyright litigation”1 along with commentary 
on related issues of law, procedure, and tactics.  TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION: FORMS AND ANALYSIS is a recent 
addition to Oxford University Press’ practitioner law publishing program, a 
series that has featured attorney-written works on patent prosecution, 
internet crimes, software licensing, and other timely and interesting areas of 
legal practice.  As advertised, the focus in TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION is on presenting a wide variety of sample 
pleadings, motions, and discovery materials used in trademark or copyright 
litigation.  Indeed, fully more than 400 pages of the text (and an 
accompanying disc) consist of these examples, while fewer than 100 pages 
contain the authors’ commentary or analysis.  For better or worse, there is 
far more by way of “forms” than “analysis” here. 
The authors are Chicago-area attorneys who bring a wealth of expertise 
honed over several decades litigating trademark and copyright disputes.  
They also teach an LL.M. course at the John Marshall Law School in 
Chicago, and an educator’s focus on pedagogy is evident throughout the 
organization and presentation of the materials in TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION.  The authors hope that their work, by 
providing actual samples of materials filed in trademark and copyright 
cases, will fill a void in the field of “how-to” books on litigation.  They do 
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not intend the forms to be “perfect examples of how things are done” but 
only real ones (p.xiii).  Ultimately, the authors hope that the samples and 
commentary will be “useful to both novice and experienced litigators in 
preparing and litigating cases in this field” (p.xiii). 
The organization of TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LITIGATION is 
logically sound and easy to follow.  It proceeds chronologically from 
prefiling case assessment, cease-and-desist demands, and jurisdiction and 
venue considerations, through Complaints, Answers and Counterclaims, 
preliminary injunctions, motions to dismiss, and concluding with written 
discovery, depositions, discovery disputes, and electronic discovery.  Most 
chapters begin with a brief, one or two-page introduction in which the 
authors highlight issues relevant to the phase of litigation under 
consideration.  On the whole, the authors succeed in covering a significant 
portion of the types of pleadings and motions most commonly recurring in 
trademark or copyright litigation. 
Much of this resource’s value to practitioners and professors alike stems 
from the authors’ well-informed selection of the exemplars included.  The 
pleadings, motions, and other documents included in TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION are high quality, well-researched, and 
carefully drafted litigation materials.  They apparently were prepared (not 
always by the authors themselves) by attorneys knowledgeable of the finer 
points of trademark or copyright law who are able to express themselves 
effectively as litigators.  Reading the sample Motions to Dismiss or Motions 
for Temporary Restraining Order, for example, affords one the opportunity 
to be instructed (or, in the case of an experienced practitioner, to be 
reminded) about important areas of law, practice, and strategy common to 
trademark or copyright litigation.  Indeed, much of the substance of 
copyright or trademark law contained within TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION will be gleaned from close reading of the fine 
examples chosen by the authors.  The reader must take into account, of 
course, that most of the exemplars are works of advocacy, and their 
representation of the law cannot be accepted fully without taking into 
account the original purpose of these documents:  to persuade a judge to the 
advocate’s point of view.  The forms, it must be said, are starting points, not 
ending points, for reviewing the law represented there. 
In addition to the points of law discussed within the forms themselves, the 
authors provide their own commentary and analysis, not only on the 
substance of copyright or trademark law, but often with respect to litigation 
procedure and strategy as well.  These analyses, however, are distributed 
unevenly over the course of the work.  The early chapters on case and 
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forum assessment and the latter ones on discovery procedures, for example, 
include considerably more analysis than the middle chapters on pleadings 
and motions, some of which include in total only a few paragraphs of 
commentary.  In this reviewer’s opinion, TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION succeeds best when the authors supplement 
the form examples with their own substantive commentary on them.   
The first chapter on “Case Assessment” crisply introduces the topic and 
showcases the authors’ evident expertise.  The authors begin appropriately 
where a seasoned litigator advising a commercial client should start:  
identifying the client’s objectives in potentially initiating trademark or 
copyright litigation.  In a brief but substantive section, the authors cogently 
discuss a wide array of strategic considerations while underscoring the 
importance of the client’s adoption of a proactive strategy to enforcement of 
its rights, rather than merely responding ad hoc to infringement concerns as 
they arise.  The authors balance the risks of filing litigation against the risks 
to the client of not taking action in the face of encroaching infringement.  
They pose crucial strategic questions about what type of cases the brand 
owning client should consider initiating.  They observe that “[o]ne approach 
is to take on the easy cases first, building a record of successful 
enforcement through publicly available consent judgments and settlements.  
Another approach is to pursue a prominent test case where a solid victory 
will create precedent to deter other infringers” (p.2).  The authors’ incisive 
chapter on case assessment alone justifies the book’s $250 purchase price. 
One might have hoped that the authors would have included a similar 
discussion of strategic defensive considerations for clients who are 
presented with the claim that they infringe another’s rights and who need to 
decide quickly whether, and how hard, to fight.  But the authors’ excellent 
and detailed review of the early investigation a client should undertake 
when contemplating litigation―e.g., types of witnesses to interview, 
documents to review, sources of useful public records―applies equally to 
the defendant in receipt of an infringement notice as to the plaintiff 
contemplating bringing a lawsuit. 
Case assessment naturally requires an understanding of the fundamentals of 
law, and the authors deliver in Chapter 1 a helpful summary of key 
governing trademark and copyright principles.  What sets this summary of 
trademark law apart from the myriad others is that its focus is through the 
lens of litigation.  Thus, we encounter not only discussion, for example, of 
the levels of trademark distinctiveness, the importance of secondary 
meaning, and the kinds of consumer confusion that invite infringement, but 
the authors also continually focus their subject matter back to the 
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practicalities of litigation, e.g., the relevance of surveys, the possible impact 
of a defendant’s insurance coverage, the availability or not of a jury, and 
much more.  With any summary work of this nature, there will be important 
topics not addressed.  For this reviewer, the most glaring omission in the 
summary of trademark law and types of actionable confusion is any 
mention of the increasingly-important theory of reverse trademark 
confusion.  Indeed, two of the forms included by the authors, Form 5.5 and 
5.7, rely prominently on the reverse confusion theory of infringement, 
making its omission from the discussion all the more perplexing.  
The section on copyright law is briefer, and one senses that the authors have 
more expertise to share when it comes to trademark cases.  This section 
highlights several copyright law issues―e.g., the importance of using the 
correct test for “substantial similarity,” scope of protection, and fair 
use―that experience shows time and again are featured in copyright 
litigation.  
The second and third chapters address other important pre-filing issues:  (1) 
cease-and-desist (or “demand”) letters and (2) forum considerations.  Even 
the newcomer to trademark and copyright litigation quickly must learn to 
understand the function, risks, and strategies related to cease-and-desist 
correspondence.  Because most trademark and copyright disputes resolve at 
the cease-and-desist stage before litigation is ever filed, a large portion of 
the practitioner’s career likely will be devoted to evaluating, preparing, 
sending, and negotiating demand letters.  The authors’ chapter on demand 
letters introduces two relevant issues, and includes three fine examples of 
such letters, but leaves the reader wanting more. 
The chapter opens by raising the concern that demand letters might provoke 
counterclaims (e.g., trade libel), followed by a cogent presentation of the 
broad protections for litigation-related demand letters found in the case law 
developed under Noer-Pennington.  The authors correctly leave the 
impression that clients who send demand letters in good faith likely will be 
safe from tort liability. 
The authors also highlight the risk of declaratory actions, but, in this 
reviewer’s opinion, the subject deserves more than a single paragraph of 
commentary.  As a result of the Supreme Court’s having expanded 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction in MedImmune2, putative infringers who 
receive demand letters now have an easier time successfully filing a 
declaratory judgment (“DJ”) action in their home venues and making it 
stick under first-to-file rules.  Thus, the brand-owning client must carefully 
review not only whether to send a demand letter, but also how to word the 
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demand to potentially avoid being “DJ-ed” in an unfavorable forum.  The 
authors present three examples of demand letters, but give no indication 
whether or not the particular wording used is more, or less, likely to present 
substantial risk of provoking a DJ action for non-infringement. 
The third chapter on choosing a forum for copyright and trademark disputes 
helpfully recognizes that federal civil courts are not the only alternative for 
a client with a trademark or copyright infringement problem.  The 
International Trade Commission (“ITC”), the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board (“TTAB”), arbitrations, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”), and even foreign tribunals all may have advantages that an 
informed client should consider.  The authors are at their best succinctly 
discussing the various procedures and available remedies that may make 
one type of forum more or less advantageous than another.  Their 
experience as litigators shines through in this chapter.  Further, they ably 
summarize the law relating to personal jurisdiction, highlighting jurisdiction 
as it relates to internet activities and the Calder3 effects test.  This reviewer 
appreciates too the inclusion of less familiar types of jurisdiction, such as in 
rem jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction obtained pursuant to the 
whole-contacts doctrine of FRCP 4(k)(2).  
Chapters 4 through 6 feature a significant variety of sample pleadings, 
injunction motions, and motions to dismiss.  There is little separate 
commentary or analysis here, but nonetheless the exemplars themselves will 
be highly educational for those willing to work with them.  Indeed, much of 
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LITIGATION proceeds based on a 
show, not tell, method and leaves much for the reader to investigate for him 
or herself.  For example, the final 38 pages of Chapter 4 consist of a 
Complaint and Answer & Counterclaim in a trademark infringement matter, 
introduced simply by the comment that this involved a “complicated 
dispute” where both parties “take a detailed narrative approach to pleading, 
attempting to tell a persuasive story about the dispute” (p.119).  With only 
this general point about narration, the reader is left to determine what 
potential lessons of strategy, procedure, and drafting are illustrated by these 
38 pages of pleadings.  The authors might have used the form pleadings in 
Chapter 4, for example, to explain the appropriate uses of “information and 
belief” pleading in trademark cases, the strategies for pleading use of a 
mark that is often found in conjunction with a geographical designation, the 
tactic of pleading general and specific forms of relief, the risks and benefits 
of narrative-type pleading, and much more.  But, then TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION would either have had to focus more narrowly 
or would have been a more voluminous work.  I cannot fault the authors’ 
choice to be comprehensive in scope but compact in execution by leaving 
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much of the analytic detail to be investigated by the reader.  For those with 
the patience and fortitude to examine the forms and tease out their finer 
points with reference to other works, there are many helpful illustrations 
compiled here. 
The authors’ selection of examples is especially valuable because they have 
included both basic complaints and motions that cover all the requirements 
standard to trademark and copyright pleadings and motions, as well as more 
complex pleadings and motions that introduce a substantial variety of legal 
issues.  The basic pleadings can be adapted by practitioners for use in many 
straightforward trademark infringement matters.  (One wonders why the 
authors did not include a basic copyright infringement complaint, however.  
Indeed, on the whole, copyright law is not as well represented in this 
resource as trademark law.)  As for the more “exotic” pleadings and 
motions, they introduce a great variety of legal issues that go beyond mere 
infringement matters, including “John Doe” seizure orders in anti-
counterfeiting matters, alleging proper ownership of trademarks and 
copyrights, the unavailability of “niche market” fame in trademark dilution 
matters, fraud on the PTO, cybersquatting, relevance of Rule 9(b) 
heightened pleading standards, copyright infringement based on 
unauthorized “deep linking” between web sites, and much more.  These 
sample motions make for interesting and informative reading on some of 
the most current substantive areas of copyright and trademark litigation.   
The final four chapters all deal with discovery:  written discovery, 
depositions, discovery disputes, and electronic discovery.  In Chapter 7 on 
written discovery, the authors provide well-formulated examples of the 
types of interrogatories, production requests, and requests for admission that 
cover the basic factual discovery needed for some types of copyright and 
trademark litigation, as well as sample responses and objections.  The 
authors begin by urging the reader to be familiar with the uses for and rules 
governing each type of written discovery, and by offering a few general 
introductory observations.  The authors’ commentary, though, is likely too 
cursory and general to be very helpful.  More helpful would have been more 
directed commentary concerning strategy for the particular discovery issues 
common to trademark and copyright litigation related to, for example, 
ownership, use, protectability, compliance with registration requirements, 
and damages.  There also is no mention of contention interrogatories to 
flesh out and narrow an opponent’s theory of the case or defense.  
The authors redeem themselves with their insightful discussion included in 
the remaining chapters on discovery and deposition practice.  They cogently 
explain preparing a deposition outline and offer insights, such as the 
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authors’ five “Deposition Gets”:  “Get the facts,” “Get the names,” “Get the 
admissions,” “Get ready for trial,” and “Get to know the witness” (p.414).  
They include pithy advice on preparing one’s own witnesses for deposition 
and a germane overview of the rules governing depositions generally, 
including objections at depositions.  This chapter would have been even 
more useful had the authors included a sample 30(b)(6) deposition notice 
used in trademark or copyright litigation. 
Chapter 9 on discovery disputes also contains helpful insights and forms 
appropriate to all types of litigation, including copyright and trademark 
litigation.  The authors contrast the temptation to be needlessly contentious 
in discovery and thus driving up litigation costs with the benefits gained 
from seeking rapport with opposing counsel.  The authors helpfully remind 
the reader that “[e]very communication with opposing counsel should be 
written with the understanding that it may come before the court” (p.426).  
The sample discovery objections, deficiency letters (also called “meet and 
confer” letters), and motion documents illustrate good litigation form.  The 
forms avoid the all-too-common practice of issuing boilerplate objections 
and demonstrate discovery objections that are appropriately explained and 
tailored.  They model the practice of seeking principled compromise 
through exchange of correspondence directed at supposed deficiencies in 
discovery responses.  Further, the authors helpfully highlight how to deal 
with discovery issues that recur in many types of commercial litigation, 
including, for example, the tactic of seeking to force the deposition of 
senior company executives to effect settlement leverage and the use of 
protective orders.  In the final chapter devoted to electronic discovery, the 
authors provide extensive practical advice for dealing with electronically 
stored documents in light of clients’ obligations to identify and preserve 
their reasonably accessible electronic documents. 
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LITIGATION succeeds as a work of 
reference that compiles a diverse and relevant sampling of litigation 
documents commonly used in trademark and copyright cases.  Some of the 
forms will be instructive simply for the trenchant synopses of law contained 
therein.   Some―especially the more basic trademark pleadings and 
discovery materials―could be adapted and used by practitioners where 
appropriate.  But in this reviewer’s opinion, TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT LITIGATION likely will find its highest and best use as a 
supplemental pedagogical resource for law professors and experienced 
practitioners seeking to educate students in the class or associates in the 
conference room about the practice of trademark and copyright litigation.  
Though it will not replace texts or casebooks covering the substance of 
trademark or copyright law or litigation procedures, this treasure trove of 
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litigation examples can serve to guide, stimulate, and educate those who 
would seek to become copyright and trademark litigators themselves. 
 
1 This text is from the book’s back cover. 
2 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 131-32, note 11 
(2007) (rejecting “reasonable apprehension of imminent suit” as 
prerequisite to declaratory judgment action). 
3 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984). 
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Reviewed by Timo Minssen, Centre for Information and Innovation Law, 
University of Copenhagen.  
Timo.Minssen@jur.ku.dk.   
On December 14th 2008, one of the world’s most renowned patent scholars, 
Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Joseph Straus, celebrated his 70th birthday.  Shortly 
thereafter, a great number of colleagues and friends gathered in his 
“academic home,” the Max Planck Institute at Munich’s Marstallplatz,2 to 
congratulate and pay tribute to this “distinguished grandmaster of 
intellectual property law.”3 
One of his birthday presents was a colossal book honoring his lifelong 
dedication to intellectual property law and his widely recognized 
achievements, not only in his primarily patent law-related research and 
teaching, but also in creating the Munich Intellectual Property Law Centre 
and in leading, developing, and administering academic endeavors at the 
famous Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax 
Law4 with its tremendous library and research network.  In over 900 pages 
this so-called liber amicorum5 comprises 60 (!) articles written by friends, 
colleagues and pupils from more than 15 different countries in Asia, 
America, and Europe.  The articles address a wide range of legal, economic 
and policy perspectives on various challenges related to the title of the 
book:  PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A 
GLOBALIZED ECONOMY. 
Starting with Rainer Moufang’s portrayal of the fascinating life and career 
of Professor Straus and the leitmotivs of his work (pp.VII–XVII), which is 
followed by the table of contents and a brief description of the contributors 
(pp.XIX–XXX), the book sets out to address a remarkable variety of crucial 
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 issues in the complex debates shaping today’s technology-related 
intellectual property law.  Besides dealing with topics that directly concern 
Professor Straus’ primary research interest, i.e. international and 
comparative patent law with a special focus on the policy aspects raised by 
biotechnology and the interface of IPR with competition law, the book also 
features contributions discussing various procedural, multi-jurisdictional, 
and public policy aspects from a more general perspective.  
The essays are thematically organized in 10 chapters, covering elemental 
questions of substantive patent and utility model law (Chapter 1); the 
delicate task of balancing exclusive patent rights with free market 
competition, addressing both system-immanent limitations on intellectual 
property protection (Chapter 2) and additional restrictions imposed by 
competition and antitrust laws (Chapter 3); technology specific problems 
concerning the adjustment of patent law to rapid developments in 
biotechnology and the pharmaceutical sector (Chapter 4); the legal 
protection of employee’s inventions (Chapter 5); fundamental issues related 
to IPR procedure, enforcement, and liability (Chapter 6); the protection of 
technology against unfair competition (Chapter 7); multijurisdictional 
aspects of IP (Chapter 8); recent developments in national IP and 
competition legislation (Chapter 9); and public policies influencing the 
development of intellectual property law (Chapter 10).  Finally, the book 
concludes with an additional chapter listing Prof. Straus’ numerous and 
multifaceted publications (Chapter 11). 
While many of the articles are kept reasonably short, the sheer scope and 
size of this book obviously presents a challenge to any reviewer bound to 
comply with page limitations.  In order to do the book “some justice” one 
approach could be to briefly summarize and comment on each chapter and 
article.6  Alternatively, the review could focus on a selection of articles 
covering specific issues that are of particular concern in current debates and 
that reflect the research focus of the celebrant.  Considering the significant 
recent case-law developments and debates relating to the patentability of 
biotechnological and pharmaceutical inventions in both Europe and the 
U.S., as well as Professor Straus’ main area of specialization, this review 
will follow the second approach and concentrate on the articles presented in 
Chapter 4 (Biotechnology, Pharmaceuticals and Patent Law). 
Chapter 4 comprises seven articles on more than 100 pages (pp.197–304).  
It begins with an insightful analysis by the prominent IP Professor Martin J. 
Adelman from George Washington University Law School, who also 
happens to be a “good friend of many years” to Professor Straus and one of 
the book’s co-editors.7  In his paper titled, “The Inadequacies of the Section 
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 271(e)(1) Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court” (pp.197–208), 
Adelman delivers a creative critique of recent U.S. case law developments 
concerning the applicability of the U.S. experimental use exemption with a 
particular focus on research tools.8  He follows the unusual approach of 
constructing hypothetical cases based on the facts of Roche v Bolar9 in 
order to demonstrate the effects of the decisions in Eli Lilly v Medtronic10 
and Merck v Integra.11  Based on his convincing analysis Adelman arrives 
at the conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court in Merck v Integra 
unfortunately “failed to do a clear, thoughtful and thorough job in this 
important case” (p.208).  More specifically he criticizes the fact that the 
U.S, Supreme Court not only left unanswered the position of research tools 
with respect to Section 271(e)(1), but also refused to discuss the fairness of 
depriving the patent holder of all its benefits with respect to the genus claim 
(p.208).  
Most stakeholders and academics would probably agree with Adelman that 
the Supreme Court decision was far too ambiguous and that further 
clarification is necessary to create reasonable legal certainty.  The proper 
scope and application of experimental use and regulatory approval 
exceptions will therefore certainly continue to be vividly debated in the 
years to come.  The controversy will be particularly fierce with regard to 
research tool patents.  Ideally these exceptions should guarantee that patent 
laws aimed at providing incentives for technological innovation do not 
unduly restrict scientific research, innovative medical product development, 
and generic product competition.12  In that respect, some judges and 
commentators will persist in highlighting the social harms that can result 
from a narrow interpretation of the exceptions, as demonstrated by the 
Merck decision, the (initial) invalidation of restrictively licensed stem-cell 
patents, and empirical studies suggesting that valid patents may―if the U.S. 
experimental use exception is narrowly construed―increasingly delay or 
restrict scientific research.13  Others have argued that the ambiguous 
Supreme Court judgment may have gone far beyond what is necessary 
when limiting patent rights through research exemptions, thereby 
threatening the economic incentives provided by patents for the further 
development of innovative research technologies.14  In that context it might 
also be worth adding that while experimental use and regulatory approval 
exceptions in the U.S. and the E.U. differ significantly in their history, 
scope, and application, these exceptions will presumably become even more 
essential to patent law and related regulatory policy in both Europe and the 
U.S.15  It is therefore indispensable that any debates on the appropriate 
scope of research exemptions in both Europe and the U.S. also consider the 
impact of the generally more restrictive recent case law on patentable 
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 subject matter, inventive step/non-obviousness, sufficient disclosure, and 
industrial application/utility.  These cases have made it generally more 
difficult to receive patents on immature research results and undeveloped 
tools that are merely the objects (not subjects) of further research.  This 
indicates that research exemptions should not be regarded as being the sole 
solution mechanism for tackling more or less significant problems.16  
Related to this issue is also another possibility that―due to focus and page 
limitations―could not be sufficiently addressed in Adelman’s paper:  the 
introduction of a liability rule regime to facilitate access to research tools.  
That this seemingly wonderful idea might face specific difficulties in the 
biotechnological and pharmaceutical sector has been thoroughly discussed 
in Professor Straus’ research.  In addition to the potential difficulties 
associated with the determination of appropriate royalties in absence of a 
free market mechanism and potential conflicts with Articles 27, 30 and 31 
of the TRIPS agreement, he reminds us that a liability rule regime would 
preclude exclusive licensing agreements.  Unfortunately, however, such 
agreements still seem to be absolutely essential for some types of 
biotechnological research tools.17  This is because an exclusive license 
guarantees exclusivity of research with the licensed invention, permitting 
the licensee a better prospect of recouping invested capital in the license 
itself.18  Therefore, exclusive licensing may be particularly important for 
pharmaceutical research programs seeking to develop commercial 
applications for genetic inventions such as drug targets, rather than for 
research tool uses, considering the risks and costs associated with such 
development.19  Although a potential liability regime definitely represents 
an interesting idea that deserves further consideration, sufficient capital 
investments and market returns may still depend upon the possibility of 
preventing such unlicensed research uses.20  This clearly indicates that 
particularly with regard to biotechnological research tool inventions, the 
scope of research exceptions remains a tricky issue.  The significance of 
further debate has also been emphasized by Professor Straus, who noted in 
2004 that although the empirical studies available at that time had not 
demonstrated significant problems with development, licensing, and use of 
research tools, this may be more a function of ignorance of (or disdain for) 
the legal rules than of any recognition of what they are or should be.21  All 
this adds particular weight to Adelman’s disappointment with the 
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.  The next time the Supreme Court 
is confronted with similar questions it should indeed spend more time on 
these crucial issues.  Although it seems to be impossible to deliver clear-cut 
answers, and the Supreme Court is generally prevented from giving 
judgment where there is no “live case or controversy” under the 
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 Constitutional bar in Art. III, §2, cl. 1, the establishment of more coherent 
principles creating greater legal certainty would be most welcome.  As 
recently as on August 31st, 2011 this was confirmed by the Federal Circuit 
decision in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,22 where a split 
panel re-invigorated the debate as to the scope of the experimental use 
exception from infringement and the scope of the Hatch-Waxman “safe 
harbor” for drug-related testing under 35 USC §271(e)(1).  The majority 
opinion and a strong dissent affirm the need to revisit this topic. 
Professor Adelman’s article is followed by Shoshana Berman’s thoughtful 
consideration of the hazards of biotechnology for law and society in her 
paper “Legal and Moral Reflections on Modern Biotechnology in Use & 
Misuse” (pp.209-227).  She begins with a description of international 
legislation addressing potential threats posed by dangerous or offensive uses 
of biotechnological inventions and highlights potential conflicts with the 
freedom of scientific research, and fundamental rights (pp.209-210).  In that 
respect she delivers a thorough explanation of biotechnology’s dual-use 
dilemma, i.e. in particular the blurred borders between peaceful and 
offensive uses of biotechnology, which lies at the heart of these conflicts.  
Moreover, Berman discusses unwanted risks stemming from the inherent 
unpredictability of biotechnology (pp.211-214).  That point follows a 
random look at bio-safety and bio-security legislation, as well as case law 
from the U.S., the U.K. and the E.U. (pp.214-221).  Her overview of recent 
judgments and legislation nicely demonstrates that in recent years serious 
efforts have been made by legislators and courts to control the use of and 
prevent the misuse of biological agents, although in a climate of 
uncertainties many conflicts and controversies still remain (pp.221-226).  In 
her conclusion Berman regards the determination of an adequate balance in 
conflicts between human rights and national or international security to be 
one of the most difficult issues (p.226).  While she considers the application 
of the “precautionary principle” to be necessary, she admonishes at the 
same time that “any normative framework for preventing, decreasing or 
minimizing any hostile use or misuses” must also respect the basic value of 
an “undisturbed continuation of scientific research” and the opportunity to 
publish scientific research results that do not unduly impede efforts to 
protect national security, as well as public health and safety.  Berman then 
identifies the following questions as central (p.227): 
1. How can scientific information on controversial issues be framed 
and communicated by the media, to be best absorbed and seriously 
received by policy makers, scientists and the general public? 
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 2. What mechanisms can be applied for mediating between expert 
advice and warnings on risks and dangers and the common tendency 
of the individual to distance himself from threats and warnings? 
3. What criteria shall be applied for resolving conflict of interest and 
controversies between the utilitarian-economic approach to 
scientific research, especially now in the field of new biotechnology 
and other approaches such as political, ethical, moral; social or 
religious? 
Having dealt with these issues both as a judge and lecturer, Berman finally 
notes that there is a “growing gap between scientific expertise and judicial 
knowledge.”  Since “no man is an island”23 she concludes that there is a 
clear demand for cross-ventilation between all the relevant disciplines, 
which “Professor Straus is practicing in his daily chores” (p.227).  While  
Berman concentrates on issues relating to misuses of biotechnology in 
warfare and the potentially extreme dangers posed by insufficiently 
controlled peaceful uses of viruses and bacteria, many of her findings will 
certainly also have to be discussed in (perhaps only seemingly) less 
dramatic settings.  One could, for example, think about similar problems 
related to novel scientific insights in epigenetics and nanotechnology.  
Recent research demonstrates that these rapidly developing disciplines are 
blurring the frontiers of science and present particular legal, social, ethical, 
and scientific challenges.24  Once again, law is having difficulty in keeping 
up with these rapid technological developments and finding answers to the 
questions identified by Berman will be essential even in these areas.  
The third paper in Chapter 4 with the title “Biotechnological Patenting and 
Innovation” (pp.229-241) is authored by Michael Blakeney.  It discusses a 
variety of issues that are of particular concern when discussing patents on 
biotechnological inventions.  In combining his patent law analysis with 
scientific facts and economic insights, such as Machlup’s views on the 
interplay of patenting and innovation, he addresses some crucial topics, 
including overly broad claims and actual or potential problems that these 
might create for biotechnological research (pp.230-233), patents on research 
tools (p.232), licensing issues (p.233), patent thickets (pp.233-236) and 
patent pools (pp.236-238).  Finally, Blakeney makes some remarkable 
comments on the interplay of patents with competition law (which could as 
well have made his paper part of Chapter 3).  He examines in particular the 
impact of competition law upon biotechnological licensing (p.238), as well 
as on patent pools and cross licensing (pp.238-240).  In his conclusion he 
refers to Professor Straus’ earlier realization that patents not only play a 
significant role as competitive tools in various biotechnology contexts, but 
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 also for preserving the value in biodiversity and in distributing benefits to 
source communities (p.241).  Blakeney finally notes that “in both of these 
areas further research is necessary to examine the extent to which 
competition policy can preserve the benefits which every patenting should 
secure,” a finding which corresponds well with the increased scrutiny of 
patent law by competition/antitrust authorities and courts in both Europe 
and the U.S.  
Somewhat related to these conclusions is the subsequent article by Tanuja 
Garde entitled “Circumventing the Debate over State Policy and Property 
Rights:  Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act Law” (pp.243-254).  Garde 
analyzes the historical and constitutional background to §3(d) of the Indian 
Patents Act.  This is an extraordinarily interesting provision, since it was 
introduced to prevent so-called “evergreening” strategies typically 
employed by the pharmaceutical industry.  More specifically §3(d) provides 
that the following does not constitute an invention under Indian patent law:  
“[t]he mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which 
does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that 
substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a 
known substance or of the mere new use of a known process, machine 
or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or 
employs at least one new reactant.”25 
Besides explaining the Indian debates on the redistribution of real property 
and the very critical post-independence evaluation of the patent system, 
which led to fierce opposition during India’s accession to the WTO/TRIPS 
and to the introduction of this (in)famous provision (pp.243-250), Garde 
also examines its actual impact on selected decisions relating to patents and 
patent applications by the pharmaceutical giant Novartis (pp.250-253).  She 
concludes that §3(d) effectively limits “the ability to obtain property rights 
in incremental pharmaceutical innovation, where currently the bulk of 
pharmaceutical research and developments occurs, including medicines that 
may be more effective in tropical climates, such as heat stable forms, but 
not necessarily more efficacious” (p.254).  She also observes that by 
denying any patents on such inventions, §3(d) “circumvents a battle over 
determination of just compensation or equitable remuneration, as required 
when issuing a compulsory license.”  Finally, she remarks that this calls for 
an examination of whether §3(d) might actually violate TRIPS, and in 
particular the anti-discrimination clause in Article 27 TRIPS (p.254).  
Considering Novartis’ continuing challenges to Section 3(d) at the Indian 
Supreme Court and recognizing that so-called “evergreening” strategies are 
also fiercely debated under U.S. and European patent, competition, and 
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 pharmaceutical regulatory law, Garde’s analysis provides valuable input.  
Since India is currently undertaking great efforts to strengthen its domestic 
generic industry, a similar examination of the Indian regime on data and 
market exclusivities would probably lead to equally interesting results. 
Next, the paper “Medical Use Claims:  EPC 2000 and its Impact on 
Prosecution and Enforcement” (pp.255-274) by Hans-Rainer Jaenichen, 
Jürgen Meier, and Niels Hölder analyzes the significance of the 2000 
revision of the European Patent Convention (“EPC 2000”) and its “new” 
Articles 54(4) and (5) EPC26 for the prosecution and enforcement of 
medical use claims.  The authors start by highlighting the general relevance 
of patents as incentives in the pharmaceutical sector, describing the 
increasing costs of (bio-) pharmaceutical R&D, the high proportion of 
pharmacologically interesting compounds that fail before reaching the 
clinical trial phase, and the comparatively low success rate of those 
compounds that actually make it to the clinical trial stage.  The authors then 
explain the particular concept and significance of compound patents, first 
medical use patents and patents for second (and subsequent) medical uses.  
After mentioning several examples of conventional small molecule 
pharmaceuticals and large-molecule biologics that were successfully 
protected by compound protection, the authors point out that, in some cases, 
the identification of first, second and further medical uses may actually 
provide the first prospects for profit (pp.255-256).  Besides providing 
examples of such inventions, which enjoy simplified purpose-limited claim 
protection under the EPC 2000, the authors also refer to the necessity for 
additional forms of protection that may complement patent protection, such 
as Supplementary Protection Certificates, data protection/market 
exclusivity, and orphan drug and pediatric regulations (p.256).  Next, they 
deliver a brief description of the European Patent System, followed by a 
more detailed analysis of how the European Patent Office (“EPO”) and 
national systems, such as the U.K. and Germany, deal with patents covering 
various medical use-claims of known compounds.  In that respect the 
authors refer to many different patent scenarios involving a variety of 
medical-use categories, such as novel target populations, routes of 
administration, claimed additional technical effects or treatment regimes.  
They describe how these categories are addressed by European courts in 
both patent prosecution and enforcement litigation, including various direct 
and indirect infringement situations (pp.257-274).  The authors also note the 
often stricter approach of national courts in considering validity and 
infringement, for example, in cases where the claim is essentially directed 
to an unpatentable method of medical treatment.  They finally conclude that 
while the EPC 2000 has basically left the legal situation for prosecuting and 
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unchanged,27 the new Article 54(5) EPC relating to second medical uses has 
now incorporated into the EPC what has been developed in many years by 
the EPO’s jurisprudence.  
Although it is generally believed that the purpose-limited compound claims 
that are now available for second medical uses under Article 54(5) EPC 
2000 have substantially the same effect as the previously used Swiss-type 
claims, the authors identify two main advantages (p.274).  First, the new 
regime provides, in combination with Article 138 EPC 2000, legal certainty 
since national courts will now have to respect the patentability of second 
medical use inventions (which might also encompass cleverly phrased 
claims on treatment regimes and in particular claims that make the 
treatment regime a feature of the composition itself).  Second, since a 
purpose-limited second medical use claim under Article 54(5) EPC 2000 
covers―in contrast to the previously available Swiss-type claims―off-label 
uses, the new format is likely to increase the protection of such specific uses 
and, under the principles of indirect infringement, “offers and deliveries of 
non-customized products suitable and intended/used therefore” (p.274).  
Besides clarifying advantages that the EPC 2000 entails for patentees 
during patent prosecution and litigation, another of the authors’ 
achievements lies within their interesting explanation of the various 
categories of second medical use claims that patent offices are typically 
confronted with.  Readers who are not so well-acquainted with 
pharmaceutical patenting, the EPC and the case law of the EPO, will be 
astonished by the great number and variety of purpose-limited patents for 
second medical uses of known pharmaceutical compounds already granted 
by the EPO.  On the other hand, those more familiar with (bio-) 
pharmaceutical R&D will find confirmation.  The increasing relevance of 
medical use claims clearly reflects the current paradigm shift in 
pharmaceutical R&D.  Encouraged by rapid scientific advances in 
molecular biology and an enhanced understanding of cellular pathway 
mechanisms, epigenetics and the interplay of genes and proteins, the 
industry is increasingly focusing on the development of personalized 
medicines, novel applications of known small molecule drugs, as well as 
cutting edge large-molecule biologics or biosimilars.  This will create a 
variety of challenges in several legal areas, including patent related law and 
the legal framework for regulatory exclusivity periods.  With respect to 
patent law, the scope of the aforementioned exclusions from patentability of 
medical methods, which is expressly permitted under Art. 27 TRIPS, is one 
of the most discussed issues.  The debate is particularly intense in the case 
of diagnostic methods.  
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 That specific topic is addressed in the following paper on the “Purpose and 
Limits of the Exclusion from Patentability of Medical Methods, Especially 
Diagnostic Methods” by Rudolf Kraer (pp.275-288).  In providing an 
initial overview on the genesis and substance of the excluding provisions in 
the EPC (including references to German case law and legislation on 
diagnostic methods and second medical uses), the author describes the 
systematically correct “delinking” of considerations related to the 
“industrial applicability” requirement from the patent ban on medical 
procedures under the EPC 2000 (pp.275-278).  Next, the author considers 
the various rationales for excluding medical procedures from patentability 
(pp.279-281) and describes case-law developments primarily from 
Germany and the EPO’s Technical Boards of Appeal (TBA) and Enlarged 
Board of Appeal (EBA), demonstrating that the general European bar to the 
patentability of medical methods is still very restrictively interpreted as 
applied to diagnostic methods (pp.281-288).  In his concluding remarks 
Kraer generally welcomes the more recent case law from the EPO as 
abolishing false interpretations to be found in earlier case law and 
establishing proper principles for a variety of problems, such as the question 
of when a diagnostic method is to be considered as “practiced on a human 
or animal body” and who should be considered as carrying out such 
methods.  However, he also notes flaws in the EBA’s definition of the term 
“diagnostic method.”  Quite correctly he points out that by focusing on the 
deductive activities of medical practitioners, the EBA failed “to consider the 
possibility that a restraint can take place during the data collection phase 
that a doctor needs as the basis for his conclusion.”  According to Kraer, 
this drains the established principles “of any practical relevance.”  In that 
respect the authors also admonishes that the application of Article 84 EPC 
(on the claim clarity) does not constitute an appropriate legal means “to 
resuscitate the exclusion to the extent called for by the spirit of the law.” 
Professor Kraer’s analysis clearly demonstrates that Europe is currently 
going through its own national, international, and supranational debates on 
patentable subject matter.  Due to the particular European legal framework 
the debate is characterized by specific dynamics raising some questions that 
are rather unique to the European setting.  This was confirmed in a series of 
seminal decisions by the EPO and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) both pre-28 and post-dating29 the author’s analysis.  
However, as illustrated by Kraer’s data collection example, recent 
European developments also address several issues that are very similar to 
those currently discussed in the U.S. in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos.30  Thus, comparative studies of these 
developments are now more interesting than ever.  Besides the impact of the 
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computer programs (which was the main focus of Bilski), the patentability 
of medical uses, dosage regimes, procedures and diagnostic methods seems 
in light of the above described paradigm shift in (bio)-pharmaceutical R & 
D to be the most relevant field for comparative studies.  Particularly 
interesting for this technology is a series of Federal Circuit decisions that 
were influenced by Bilski.  One of these cases, i.e. Prometheus v. Mayo,31 
will soon be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, which will provide 
further clarification for biotechnological and pharmaceutical sciences.  
Other cases might follow.  In that respect, Kraer’s discussion provides 
valuable comparative input.  Furthermore, it will be interesting to explore 
how the U.S. courts decide upon the closely related question concerning the 
appropriate scope of protection to be conferred to such inventions.  As for 
the U.S., the post Bilski CAFC decisions in Prometheus v. Mayo and AMP 
v. USPTO32 indicate that this question is particularly controversial in the 
case of pharmaceuticals and DNA- or protein-related inventions.  The 
appropriate scope of protection for such inventions is also heavily debated 
in Europe and has led to completely divergent national interpretations of 
Directive 98/44/EC (E.U. Biotech Directive).  In some national European 
patent systems, such as Sweden, Denmark, and the U.K., as well as at the 
EPO and the USPTO, full product protection seems―at least in principle 
and despite recent challenges―still to be available for qualified DNA- and 
protein-related inventions.  In contrast, however, a number of European 
states, such as Italy, France, and Germany, have enacted legislation that 
effectively limits the scope of protection conferred on such inventions.  
Some national rules even oblige the patent applicant to include the claimed 
function of complete or partial human DNA (or even protein) sequences 
with a structure that is concordant to naturally occurring sequences directly 
into the patent claims, thereby automatically limiting the scope of protection 
of the patent to that particular function.  Obviously, this special treatment of 
(human) DNA-related technology raises fundamental questions as to the 
proper interpretation of i.a. Article 27(1) TRIPS.  Moreover, this legislative 
diversity stands in stark contrast to the harmonization goal of E.U. 
Directives.  This has stimulated a widespread debate on the proper 
interpretation of the E.U. Biotech Directive and it was clear that guidance 
from the CJEU was required.33  In July 2010 some of these question were 
answered by the CJEU in C-428/08, Monsanto Technology LLC, v. Cefetra 
BV, where the CJEU held the scope of product claims on DNA sequences in 
soya beans to be limited to their function as claimed and not applicable to 
any other product, such as soya meal used for nutrition, in which the 
sequences did not fulfill their specific function.34 
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 Monsanto was decided after the publication of the book and arguably leaves 
some issues unresolved due to the specific factual circumstances underlying 
the case and the specific focus of the decision.35  Interestingly, some of the 
questions addressed in this case are discussed by the last article in Chapter 4 
titled “Special Legislation for Genetic Inventions―A Violation of Article 
27(1) TRIPS?” (pp. 289-304).  It was written by another of the editors, 
Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, who examines how far legal rules 
that exclude patent protection or limit its effects in biotechnology comply 
with the anti-discrimination clause of Article 27(1) TRIPS.  He begins by 
explaining developments in the biotechnological sector (p.290) and the 
hotly contested debates over broad patents on multifunctional 
biotechnological products that resulted in the aforementioned national legal 
responses (p.291).  This is followed by a description of various national 
legislation that introduced restrictive infringement rights and claim 
limitation for certain DNA- or protein-related inventions into French, 
German, Italian, and Swiss patent laws in order to mitigate the envisaged 
negative effects of overly broad biotechnology patents (pp.291-293).  Next, 
the author scrutinizes the definition of “discrimination” (pp.293-295) and 
the extent of permissible “differential” treatment under TRIPS (pp.295-
303).  He also discusses various policy aspects and rationales against 
permitting sectoral derogation from general provisions.  Prinz zu Waldeck 
und Pyrmont concludes that “restricting the scope of gene patents to the 
disclosed purpose while maintaining the principle of absolute product 
protection for all other technical fields,” such as in German, French, Italian, 
and Swiss patent law, “undoubtedly violates Article 27(1)” TRIPs and adds 
that even a broad interpretation of TRIPS cannot justify such legislation 
(p.304).  From a practical point of view, the author further warns that “using 
the fact that the object of the invention is a “gene” as the basis for a legal 
categorization does not appear very helpful” due to the increasingly 
disputed and “fuzzy” definition of a gene.36  Finally, he observes that such 
technology-specific (patent) legislation “is backwards oriented and bears the 
danger of becoming obsolete or ill-fitting with the progress of technology” 
(p.304). 
While other commentators,37 as well as the AG and the CJEU in Monsanto, 
have taken a different view, it should perhaps be noted that an interesting 
“middle position” was expressed by Professor Straus in 2003.  He 
differentiated between gene sequences whose isolation required an 
inventive activity and those situations where the examination of the relevant 
state of technology reveals that the inventive merit “merely” lies in the 
clarification of the function of a newly discovered gene that had been 
isolated by application of routine techniques.38  In the first situation, which 
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 due to scientific developments has become very rare, full product protection 
might perhaps be justified, whereas the latter situation would arguably only 
justify purpose limited product protection.  This is certainly an appealing 
idea.  However, today it seems as if these discussions have indeed lost some 
of their practical relevance.  There are basically four related main reasons 
for this notion:  1) most of the sometimes overly broad patents that were 
granted in the early days of the biotechnological revolution have now 
expired or are about to expire; 2) recent advances in synthetic biology have 
made it possible to construct genes or proteins that do not necessarily 
correspond to natural sequences and to influence their specific functions; 3) 
due to legislative and procedural changes it has generally become easier to 
attack overly broad product claims during patent litigation; and 4) as for 
patent prosecution, rapid scientific developments and the strict application 
of basic patentability requirements, such as inventive step and sufficient 
disclosure, have made it more difficult to receive full product patents on 
naturally occurring DNA and protein sequences.  These are often already 
disclosed or have been isolated by routine methods.  Moreover, an 
increasing number of naturally occurring functions have been identified or 
can be predicted by the application of modern technology (although it may 
be argued that these functions and their interplay have proven to be much 
more complex than previously contemplated).  As a consequence, modern 
science is focusing on truly inventive applications of gene and protein 
technology which are often more limited in scope and therefore do not raise 
the same problems with regard to full product protection.  Accordingly, 
both the author’s interesting contribution and the conflicting CJEU 
judgment in Monsanto illustrate very nicely that legal reactions once more 
appear to have difficulties in keeping up with scientific developments.  Be 
that as it may, emerging technologies will certainly pose similar questions 
in the future and the general significance of this discussion for the 
development of legal doctrines and principles remains undisputed.  Prinz zu 
Waldeck und Pyrmont is therefore generally correct in pointing out that 
legislators and policy makers should be extremely cautious before 
introducing technology-specific patent legislation.  In that regard it should 
particularly be recognized that, while problems with overly broad product 
patents appeared to be most severe ten years ago, the strict application of 
patentability requirements and further solution mechanisms seem now to 
have taken effect.  Hopefully, this will alleviate some of the initial concerns 
about impeding effects on biomedical research, which – as also pointed out 
by the author (p.300)―have often not been validated.39  Last but not least, 
it is important to realize that the early grant of (from a hindsight 
perspective) perhaps overly broad patents has been an important factor in 
stimulating the biotechnologica 40l revolution.  
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Since this review only addresses a selection from among the contributions, 
it should be added that most of the remaining authors have written equally 
interesting essays on equally exciting topics.  It can further be concluded 
that the editors, most of whom also contributed papers, have generally 
succeeded in the difficult task of structuring, systemizing, and arranging the 
different parts.  This has resulted in a very readable book.  But are there any 
flaws?   
Considering the numerous useful case law citations, as well as the size and 
scope of the book, a minor imperfection may perhaps be found in the 
general absence of any cross-references, indexes or tables of cases.  Those 
deeply engaged in legal research might realize this ellipsis as it renders 
serious study of this book a little more inconvenient.  Yet, it should also be 
born in mind that this might have delayed the completion of the book and 
timing is obviously a crucial factor for such a special birthday present.  
These minor slips are therefore excusable, although they should perhaps be 
remedied by a supplement satisfying even the most pedantic, nit-picking 
critics. 
Leaving aside these subtleties, it can be assumed that Professor Straus has 
studied his birthday present with great pleasure and interest.  While he 
might not fully agree with some of the findings and proposals presented in 
it, the overall theme of the book indeed “reflects Joseph Straus’ pronounced 
interest in the patent system and the challenges that it faces both on a 
national and international level.”41  There is no doubt that the editors and 
authors have compiled a magnificent book and a worthy tribute to honor the 
career of a truly exceptional patent scholar.  For years to come, this 
immense collection of essays will provide stimulation and inspiration to 
many academics and their students.  Consequently, this book is also of great 
interest to stakeholders, policy makers, judges, and practitioners.  
This is an extraordinarily interesting book well suited to honor the 
outstanding career of an extraordinary scholar in an extraordinarily exciting 
era for intellectual property and competition law.  It ought to be found in 
any library that has reserved space for IP-related literature. 
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Law professors Sonia Katyal (Fordham) and Eduardo Peñalver (Cornell) 
have produced a vivid and engaging chronicle of “the complex phenomenon 
of property disobedience.”  Property disobedience is civil disobedience that 
has some relationship to property, be it real property, intellectual property, 
natural resources or even chattels.  People who engage in illegal property 
disobedience are denominated property outlaws.  Those who act decisively 
in spheres in which the law is less certain, such as by boldly asserting the 
right to make fair use of a copyrighted work, are denominated property 
“altlaws” by Peñalver and Katyal.  They describe the objective of this 
project as an effort to identify some of the ways in which property 
disobedience has sometimes spurred innovation and actually strengthened 
the rule of law.  They also implicitly suggest that almost any act of civil 
disobedience can be categorized and analyzed as property disobedience, 
using the tools and lenses they employ throughout the tome. 
This book challenges the notion that rigidly fostering stability in the private 
ownership of property is the only appropriate goal of the legal system.  The 
authors assert that dynamic sociopolitical responses to civil disobedience by 
lawbreakers sometimes propel beneficial legal reforms in a wide array of 
contexts.  Property outlaws with clean hands and good hearts, they argue, 
can productively draw attention to the need to reform ossified property 
laws.  In the words sometimes attributed to the historical rock star of 
successful civil disobedience Mohandas Ghandi:  “First they ignore you, 
then they ridicule you, then they fight you, and then you win.”1 
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The book discusses the mechanics of social change in a number of contexts 
that often don’t seem linearly linked to “property” in any traditional sense, 
until the authors connect the dots.  It opens with a description of a lunch 
counter sit-in to protest racial discrimination in North Carolina in 1960, and 
moves smoothly to a discussion of the copyright law-based impediments to 
legal distribution of the 1987 documentary about the civil rights movement, 
“Eyes on the Prize,” and the protests by anti-copyright activists that this 
triggered.  The intersection of real property laws and racism is juxtaposed 
with the conflicts between intellectual property rights and an audiovisual 
documentary account of that intersection.  Illegal acts led to changes in the 
law in the first instance, and to some increase in public access to an 
important source of historical information in the second. 
Peñalver and Katyal’s accounts of these and myriad other acts of civil 
disobedience that have effected changes in property laws are presented in an 
erudite and detailed but still accessible manner that makes this tome very 
appealing.  I began reading it with a little bit of trepidation, because so 
many books touted as putting forth an “intriguingly counterintuitive 
proposition” (those words appear in a blurb on the back cover) are often 
riddled with caricatures of the status quo, crafted to artificially inflate the 
seeming intelligence and importance of the authors’ observations.  Like 
most areas of the law, property ownership is complicated, often inconsistent 
and sometimes completely incoherent.  Anytime a work purports to be the 
Grand, Unified Theory of anything, my inner cynic is activated and on high 
alert. 
But I never got the sense that these authors were choosing anecdotes to 
illustrate some purported monolithic “common wisdom” and build a case 
against its conveniently constructed flaws.  Nor are they heavy handed with 
the conclusions they draw from their examples, nor the reactions and 
responses they recommend.  They do not oversell their thesis, and give the 
reader room to independently process the stories they tell, which is a real 
strength of the tome.  In fact, they claim not to have “a general theory of 
shifts in legal regimes, or even in property law” (p.15) at all. I found this 
really refreshing.   
The authors sketch out a flexible taxonomy of outlawism that separates 
acquisitive from expressive disobedience, and intentional law breaking from 
actions taken in a shifting framework of legal uncertainty.  They explain 
that context is important but rarely determinative and provide a rich and 
varied menu of potential responses to a range of ownership law 
transgressions.  The open-minded reader will be persuaded that sometimes 
law breakers should be accommodated, rather than punished. 
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Peñalver and Katyal appropriately tell stories from many different regions 
of the world. Chapter 6, entitled “Acquisitive Altlaws:  The Treatment 
Action Campaign, Patents, and Public Health” is particularly gripping in its 
account of struggles in South Africa and Brazil for access to drugs that treat 
HIV/AIDS.  The authors make a succinct but convincing case that western 
patent law regimes literally privilege property over human life. Aggressive 
assertions of intellectual property rights across borders in general can look 
awfully colonial. It is hard not to pull for the outlaws in this scenario.   
At the same time, the authors acknowledge that too little law enforcement 
can also be problematic, which resonated powerfully with me.  Moreover, 
the intersection of this book and my real space life somewhat complicated 
my reaction to it.  I am spending the year in China on a Fulbright grant.  
One of the defining characteristics of Shanghai, where I currently reside, is 
the chaos one often finds in public spaces, despite China’s reputation for 
being a highly authoritarian nation.  Simply crossing city streets in every 
Chinese city I have visited is an extremely dangerous endeavor.  As another 
Fulbrighter put it, in China you have to repress everything you think you 
know about traffic rules, traffic patterns, and traffic safety, or death awaits 
you.  Bus drivers plough through crowds and red lights with seeming 
impunity.  Motorists rarely wear seat belts, and tend to impinge on 
designated bike lanes.  Bicyclists do not wear helmets, and expect 
pedestrians to cede right of way to them on sidewalks.2  I pay a lot more 
attention to my surroundings as a pedestrian in Shanghai than I ever have 
before, but that hasn’t kept me entirely safe, and every day I walk in fear of 
getting hit by a bicycle yet again, or sideswiped by a peddler’s cart, or 
pulverized by a bus that routinely runs a red light, or flattened by a taxi 
taking a shortcut over the sidewalk. It did not surprise me at all to read in 
the New York Times that “traffic accidents are the leading cause of death 
for people in China under the age of 45.”3 
I’m further informed, and believe, that there are laws that would regulate 
transportation-related conduct if they were enforced; but for reasons 
economic and political, they are not.  As a general matter traffic probably 
flows far faster in a city of 23 million people when it is largely unpoliced.  
However, individuals who are adversely affected by the self-serving 
behaviors of others pay a heavy price for this anarchic efficiency. 
Social scientists could provide more nuanced explanations for the 
dangerous state of China’s roads, and economists more erudite buzz words, 
but the bottom line is that everyone tries to get where they are going as 
quickly and conveniently as possible.  They don’t follow any discernible set 
of proscribed rules, nor expect any one else to.  And it is profoundly clear 
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that obeying rules as a lone actor will not make you or anyone else any 
safer.  People have to believe in the justicial and pragmatic validity of 
traffic laws for them to have any effect, especially if the government is not 
going to enforce them energetically.  The same is true of property and 
intellectual property laws, as Katyal and Peñalver explain far more 
elegantly.   
The authors refer to Robert Cover’s famous essay4 “Nomos and Narrative”5 
periodically in their text (per index, pp.25, 32, 77, 141; 234-35), and it 
seems clear they were, like so many legal scholars, greatly influenced by 
Cover’s trenchant observations about laws and social norms.  They build 
from Cover’s assumption that when people align their behaviors with their 
personal perceptions of right and wrong and that puts them in conflict with 
the legal system, productive challenges to the exigent laws sometimes 
ensue, while other times justice may simply be achieved in an alternative 
sphere, outside the world of courts or police officers.  And of course there is 
at least one more possibility, which is that there can be negative 
consequences when people ignore the law in favor of their own preferences, 
see e.g. the dangerous roads of China.  As Greg Lastowka has noted in his 
own review of this book,6 lawbreaking isn’t always heroic and sometimes 
outlaws are just bad news.   
The book closes with a description of San Francisco Mayor Gavin 
Newson’s decision in 2004 to provoke a legal fight about the boundaries of 
California citizenship rights by issuing marriage certificates to same-sex 
couples in contravention of existing law.  This dramatically ratcheted up the 
legal and civic debates about discrimination against lesbians and gays.  
Whether this rather profound act of civil disobedience will result in positive 
and permanent legal changes remains unclear, but the authors, and this 
author, too, are optimistic. 
If the volume had been written to my personal specifications rather than 
reflecting the authors’ own interests and desires, it might have included a 
few more examples of acts of well intentioned civil disobedience that 
backfired, further entrenching socially undesirable property laws.  
Sometimes that can happen, as outlaws who meaningfully threaten the 
positive and peaceful aspects of property stability tend to inspire cautionary 
tales when they come to regrettable ends, because history is usually written 
and controlled by the machinery of the status quo.  But it is still a terrific 
book as-is, and I emphatically recommend it to readers. 
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ENDNOTES  
 
1 www.quotedb.com/quotes/2776. 
2 The U.S. State Department explained the situation as follows:  
“Traffic is chaotic and largely unregulated, and right-of-way and other 
courtesies are usually ignored.  The average Chinese driver has fewer than 
five years’ experience behind the wheel and the rate of traffic accidents in 
China, including fatal accidents, is among the highest in the world.  Cars, 
bicycles, motorbikes, trucks, and buses often treat road signs and signals as 
advisory rather than mandatory.  Pedestrians never have the right of way, 
and you should always be careful while traveling in, or even walking near, 
traffic.  Child safety seats are not widely available in China, and most taxis 
and other cars do not have seat belts in the back seats.  Motorcycle and 
bicycle accidents are frequent and often serious.  If you decide to ride a bike 
or motorcycle, wear a helmet.” 
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1089.html#traffic_safety. 
3 www.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/world/asia/27rail.html. 
4 Actually it was a law review issue foreword, which makes all the attention 
it has garnered in the years since its publication even more remarkable. 
5 Cover, Robert M., “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term–Foreword:  Nomos 
and Narrative” (1983).  Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2705. 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2705. 
6 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1939899. 
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